Centralized allocation in multiple markets
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Publication:898664
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.002zbMath1368.91118OpenAlexW1537982990MaRDI QIDQ898664
Daniel Monte, Norovsambuu Tumennasan
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/10743
Related Items (5)
Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
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