Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.006zbMath1368.91015OpenAlexW2102546026MaRDI QIDQ898668

László Á. Kóczy

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/33738/1/Koczy_Stationary_consistent...JME_u.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

partition functionimplementationexternalitiesstationary perfect equilibriumrecursive coretime consistent equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Subgame perfect coalition formation ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

Cites Work

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