Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games
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Publication:898685
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.005zbMath1368.91105OpenAlexW1855981169MaRDI QIDQ898685
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski, Volker Britz
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/dc9bdfa5-30d8-4eab-b034-696aa04d7b36
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities
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