Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
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Publication:898694
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.004zbMath1368.91109OpenAlexW1844144191MaRDI QIDQ898694
Antonio Miralles, Isa E. Hafalir
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.09.004
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)
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Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information ⋮ Selecting a winner with external referees ⋮ Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers ⋮ A marriage matching mechanism menagerie ⋮ Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
Cites Work
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- Efficient compromising
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Matching through position auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
- Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
- Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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