Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
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Publication:898752
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.006zbMath1331.91063OpenAlexW2014337128MaRDI QIDQ898752
Olivia J. Erdélyi, Jörg Rothe, Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi
Publication date: 18 December 2015
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.03.006
Related Items (11)
The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited ⋮ The complexity of priced control in elections ⋮ Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules ⋮ The possible winner with uncertain weights problem ⋮ Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas ⋮ The Complexity Landscape of Outcome Determination in Judgment Aggregation ⋮ Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks ⋮ Approximation and hardness of shift-Bribery ⋮ Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model ⋮ Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information ⋮ Structural control in weighted voting games
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