Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
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Publication:899165
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2015.06.003zbMath1346.91074OpenAlexW2295870642MaRDI QIDQ899165
Simi Haber, Or Sheffet, Ioannis Caragiannis, Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier, Ariel D. Procaccia
Publication date: 21 December 2015
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.06.003
Utility theory (91B16) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Voting almost maximizes social welfare despite limited communication
- The learnability of voting rules
- Dichotomy for voting systems
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
- PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
- On the Justice of Decision Rules
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Neural Network Learning
- Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
- Lower Bounds for Approximation by Nonlinear Manifolds
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