Allocation rules for coalitional network games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003zbMath1331.91018OpenAlexW2110280087MaRDI QIDQ899386

Ana Mauleon, Jean-François Caulier, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.08.003

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (2)

Stable and efficient coalitional networks ⋮ Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

Cites Work

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• The lattice of embedded subsets
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• The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
• Contractually stable networks
• Allocation rules for network games
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Cooperation when some players are incompatible
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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