The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.10.002zbMath1331.91113OpenAlexW1855679385MaRDI QIDQ899387

Carsten Krabbe Nielsen

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/w0918.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Financial conditions and supply decisions when firms are risk averse

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• On rationally confident beliefs and rational overconfidence
• Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
• A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

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