Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005zbMath1368.91023OpenAlexW1901855377MaRDI QIDQ899496

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionperfect informationequilibrium existencebackwards inductionlarge extensive form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (10)

Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? ⋮ Characterizations of perfect recall ⋮ Costless delay in negotiations ⋮ Parameterized games of perfect information ⋮ Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices ⋮ Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games ⋮ Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result ⋮ A survey on the relationship between the game of cops and robbers and other game representations ⋮ Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit

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