Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.11.001zbMath1368.91121OpenAlexW2176946348MaRDI QIDQ899499

Delong Meng, Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent problemworst-casecontractlocal robustnessoptimality-robustness tradeoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Optimal contracts and asset prices in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• The robustness of robust implementation
• Locally robust implementation and its limits
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Sellers with Misspecified Models
• Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information

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