Stochastic stability in assignment problems

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.002zbMath1368.91160OpenAlexW3023961125MaRDI QIDQ899503

Jonathan Newton, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2014/201405.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityassignment problemdecentralization(core) stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry, Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes, Competing conventions with costly information acquisition, An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games, Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching, Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems, Trader matching and the selection of market institutions, The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets, Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration, Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture, Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability, Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games, A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Coalitional stochastic stability
• Stochastic stability for roommate markets
• Large deviations and multinomial probit choice
• Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Paths to stability in the assignment problem
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• A property of the core
• Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games
• Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
• Stochastic stability on general state spaces
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting Process
• Recontracting Stability
• Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
• Solutions for the Stable Roommates Problem with Payments
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• A behavioral study of ``noise in coordination games