Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach
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Publication:899674
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.008zbMath1369.91021OpenAlexW1951698583MaRDI QIDQ899674
Drew Fudenberg, Lorens A. Imhof, Glenn Ellison
Publication date: 30 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.10.008
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