Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.005zbMath1369.91069OpenAlexW2186550379MaRDI QIDQ899678

Neil Wallace, Tai-Wei Hu

Publication date: 30 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/130641731/cournot_11_3_15_N.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymechanism designinformation aggregationmarket game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

Cites Work

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• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
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• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Uncertainty Resolution, Private Information Aggregation and the Cournot Competitive Limit
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

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