A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90070-4zbMath1328.91014OpenAlexW1986690715MaRDI QIDQ899726

Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90070-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers, The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority, The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval, Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies, Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining, Stochastic Superiority Equilibrium in Game Theory, Finite horizon bargaining with outside options and threat points

Cites Work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The Bargaining Problem
• Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
• A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model