Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2zbMath1328.91131OpenAlexW4230336432MaRDI QIDQ899767

Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions ⋮ Equilibria in open common value auctions ⋮ Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions ⋮ On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information ⋮ An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values ⋮ Successful uninformed bidding ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions