A new class of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to the principal-agent problem

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90110-2zbMath1328.91078OpenAlexW2078864473MaRDI QIDQ899785

Shin Hwan Chiang, Satyajit Ghosh, Murray Brown, Elmar G. Wolfstetter

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90110-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• Risk Independence and Multiattributed Utility Functions
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