Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90178-3zbMath1328.91094OpenAlexW1972014033WikidataQ59973088 ScholiaQ59973088MaRDI QIDQ899832

William Thomson

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90178-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• A property of the demand correspondence of a concave utility function
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

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