On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90225-9zbMath1328.91130OpenAlexW2072443464MaRDI QIDQ899875

Dan Levin

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90225-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Decision theory for games (91A35) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Related Items

Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions

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