Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90028-0zbMath1328.91026OpenAlexW2011063109MaRDI QIDQ899913

Kaushik Basu

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90028-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games ⋮ Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games ⋮ Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma

Cites Work

• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Strategic irrationality in extensive games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The chain store paradox
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Finitely Repeated Games

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