Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90157-1zbMath1328.91033OpenAlexW1985107832MaRDI QIDQ899922

Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90157-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Cooperation in an one-shot prisoners' dilemma

Cites Work

• Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Finitely Repeated Games

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