Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90173-XzbMath1328.91127MaRDI QIDQ899951

Michael Hoel

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

On continuous-time Markov processes in bargaining ⋮ A spatial evolutionary version of the ultimatum game as a toy model of income distribution ⋮ Social opportunities and the evolution of fairness ⋮ Strategic step-by-step negotiation

Cites Work

• A non-cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon
• Bargaining conventions
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining Games with Nonlinear Utility Functions
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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