Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90117-0zbMath1328.91215OpenAlexW2022789033MaRDI QIDQ899987

Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90117-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly