The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
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Publication:899999
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(87)90062-0zbMath1328.91073OpenAlexW2052437985MaRDI QIDQ899999
Dominique Lepelley, Boniface Mbih
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90062-0
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