Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90044-4zbMath1328.91123OpenAlexW2059667581MaRDI QIDQ900052

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/28860

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release ⋮ The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale ⋮ The case for multi-unit single-run descending-price auctions ⋮ Multi-unit pay-your-bid auctions with variable awards ⋮ A multiple-object auction with superadditive values ⋮ A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands ⋮ Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design

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