On the constrained Walrasian and Lindahl correspondences

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90188-7zbMath1328.91063OpenAlexW2152264176WikidataQ126536280 ScholiaQ126536280MaRDI QIDQ900091

Guoqiang Tian

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90188-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (6)

Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation ⋮ On the set of Pareto efficient allocations in economies with public goods ⋮ Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension ⋮ Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations ⋮ Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods

Cites Work

• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Unnamed Item

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