Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
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Publication:900143
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(88)90172-3zbMath1328.91034OpenAlexW2097226409WikidataQ127452525 ScholiaQ127452525MaRDI QIDQ900143
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(88)90172-3
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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