Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.06.007zbMath1331.91114OpenAlexW836409565MaRDI QIDQ900252

Murat Yılmaz

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Screening with privacy on (im)persistency ⋮ A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem

Cites Work

• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• Choice and Procrastination
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents

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