Hyper-stable collective rankings

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.002zbMath1331.91072OpenAlexW795297026MaRDI QIDQ900257

Lainé, Jean

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Hyper-stable social welfare functions

Cites Work

• An example in group preference
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Monotonicity of `ranking by choosing': a progress report
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
• Majority voting on orders

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