Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.005zbMath1330.91131OpenAlexW2152388675MaRDI QIDQ900404

Simone Tonin, Sayantan Ghosal, Giulio Codognato

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/16503/1/16503.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreWalras equilibriumCournot-Nash equilibriummixed exchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Related Items (5)

Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian ⋮ Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part ⋮ Arbitrage pricing in non-Walrasian financial markets

Cites Work

• Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
• Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
• The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
• Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
• Strategic market games: an introduction.
• Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices
• The strategic Marshallian cross
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big
• Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games

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