Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian
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Publication:900404
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.005zbMath1330.91131OpenAlexW2152388675MaRDI QIDQ900404
Simone Tonin, Sayantan Ghosal, Giulio Codognato
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/16503/1/16503.pdf
Related Items (5)
Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian ⋮ Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part ⋮ Arbitrage pricing in non-Walrasian financial markets
Cites Work
- Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
- Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
- The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
- Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices
- The strategic Marshallian cross
- Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big
- Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games
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