Bayesian repeated games and reputation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014zbMath1330.91032OpenAlexW2030483087MaRDI QIDQ900408

Françoise Forges, Antoine Salomon

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

discountingincomplete informationrepeated gamepublic goodreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games

Cites Work

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