Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
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Publication:900410
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.011zbMath1330.91113OpenAlexW1949907886MaRDI QIDQ900410
Francesco Carli, Gaetano Antinolfi
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_892.pdf
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Cites Work
- Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
- The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts
- Dynamic costly state verification
- Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
- Stochastic costly state verification and dynamic contracts
- Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable
- Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model
- The Economics of Labor Coercion
- Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
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