Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.013zbMath1330.91017OpenAlexW1933816528MaRDI QIDQ900411

Ryota Iijima

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

networksequilibrium selectionasymmetric gamesglobal gamesperfect foresight dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites Work

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