Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
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Publication:900426
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.004zbMath1330.91119OpenAlexW1875750756MaRDI QIDQ900426
Christoph Wagner, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.004
Related Items (3)
Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information ⋮ Selling with evidence
Cites Work
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
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- Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
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- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
- Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
- Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
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