Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.004zbMath1330.91119OpenAlexW1875750756MaRDI QIDQ900426

Christoph Wagner, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

signalingmoral hazardmechanism designinformed principalinformation rents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (3)

Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information ⋮ Selling with evidence

Cites Work

• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• Competition between asymmetrically informed principals
• On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal
• Informed principal and countervailing incentives
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology

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