Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009zbMath1330.91102OpenAlexW3121361211MaRDI QIDQ900435

Tristan Tomala, Ludovic Renou

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicefficiencyMarkov processesimplementationmechanism designundetectability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents ⋮ Repeated implementation: a practical characterization ⋮ Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games ⋮ Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• Complexity and repeated implementation
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• Hoeffding's inequality for uniformly ergodic Markov chains
• Dynamic sender-receiver games
• Efficiency in Games With Markovian Private Information
• Efficient Repeated Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Prediction, Learning, and Games

This page was built for publication: Approximate implementation in Markovian environments