The logic of backward induction

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.004zbMath1330.91038OpenAlexW3122309279MaRDI QIDQ900436

Itai Arieli, Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp652.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionperfect informationcommon strong beliefstrong beliefsyntactic interactive epistemology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items

Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: a new proof for Battigalli's theorem ⋮ Rationalizability and logical inference ⋮ Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games

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