Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.014zbMath1330.91018OpenAlexW2136037195MaRDI QIDQ900442

John van den Berghe, Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.014

zbMATH Keywords

complexitybounded rationalityskill

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Trait-Augmented Games with Limited-Skill Agents

Cites Work

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• When more is less: limited consideration
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• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium

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