Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
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Publication:900449
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.002zbMath1330.91115OpenAlexW2124941520MaRDI QIDQ900449
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/408445/1/tour.pdf
Related Items (3)
The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity ⋮ Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion ⋮ The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice
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