Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.007zbMath1330.91101OpenAlexW2161967124MaRDI QIDQ900451

Marion Oury

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

robust implementationhigh order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

Cites Work

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• The robust selection of rationalizability
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Continuous Implementation
• Uniform topologies on types
• On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Critical Types
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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