Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
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Publication:900598
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.018zbMath1330.91005OpenAlexW1822083875MaRDI QIDQ900598
Alessandro Pavan, Dirk Bergemann
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.018
Proceedings of conferences of miscellaneous specific interest (00B25) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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