Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004zbMath1330.91096OpenAlexW2050772106MaRDI QIDQ900602

Daniel F. Garrett, Alessandro Pavan

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.004

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionmoral hazardadverse selectionincentivesdynamic mechanism designpersistent productivity shocks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (10)

Relational contracts in a persistent environment ⋮ Robust contracting with additive noise ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Optimal stopping with private information ⋮ Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach ⋮ A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model ⋮ A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ How to share it out: the value of information in teams ⋮ Ambiguity in dynamic contracts

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
• Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
• Sequential Screening
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• A Variational Approach to Contracting under Imperfect Observations
• Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle
• Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

This page was built for publication: Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach