Optimal auction design under non-commitment
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Publication:900604
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.007zbMath1330.91103OpenAlexW3125609476MaRDI QIDQ900604
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.007
Related Items (14)
The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities ⋮ Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation ⋮ Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu ⋮ Repeated contracting without commitment ⋮ Information design in sequential procurement ⋮ Progressive participation ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment ⋮ An optimal slow Dutch auction ⋮ Reserve prices in repeated auctions ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales ⋮ Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
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