Dynamic screening with limited commitment
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Publication:900605
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.015zbMath1330.91093OpenAlexW3124151583MaRDI QIDQ900605
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-485.pdf
asymmetric informationdynamic mechanism designsequential screeninglimited commitmentrecontractingtype-dependent participation
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Cites Work
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Calendar mechanisms
- Sequential Screening
- Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
- Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
- Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
- Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
