An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.008zbMath1330.91069OpenAlexW2039213570MaRDI QIDQ900611

Tilman Börgers, Katalin Bognar, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanism designparticipation costscostly voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design, The price of `one person, one vote', The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting

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