Sequential information disclosure in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.004zbMath1330.91089OpenAlexW3122603591MaRDI QIDQ900612

Dirk Bergemann, Achim Wambach

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.004

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionsinformation structureinterim equilibriumindependent private value auctionposterior equilibriumsequential disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design ⋮ Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result ⋮ Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities ⋮ Shuttle diplomacy ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Sequential information disclosure in auctions ⋮ Ex post information rents in sequential screening

Cites Work

• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Sequential information disclosure in auctions
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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