Half-full or half-empty? A model of decision making under risk
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Publication:901229
DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2015.06.006zbMath1354.91036OpenAlexW2136147028MaRDI QIDQ901229
Alberto Feduzi, Andrea Gheno, Massimiliano Corradini, Marisa Cenci
Publication date: 23 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2015.06.006
prospect theorydecision under riskoptimism/pessimismdecision-making paradoxesexpected value criterion
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Cites Work
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