Manipulation of the Pareto semi-optimal rule

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90260-7zbMath1328.91074OpenAlexW2009156627MaRDI QIDQ902625

Michael Treglia

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90260-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Manipulation and the Pareto rule
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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