The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
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Publication:902685
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90225-5zbMath1328.91022OpenAlexW2073722044MaRDI QIDQ902685
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90225-5
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08)
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Cites Work
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- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- Stability in Voting
- A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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