Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
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Publication:902696
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(89)90081-5zbMath1328.91084OpenAlexW2003595208WikidataQ127065867 ScholiaQ127065867MaRDI QIDQ902696
Ben Lockwood, Jonathan P. Thomas
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(89)90081-5
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