Capacitated network design games

DOI10.1007/s00224-014-9540-1zbMath1327.91018OpenAlexW2172882040MaRDI QIDQ904684

Michal Feldman, Tom Ron

Publication date: 13 January 2016

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-014-9540-1

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycapacitycost sharingprice of anarchyprice of stabilitynetwork design games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

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• Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
• Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
• Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
• Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
• Efficient graph topologies in network routing games
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
• Potential games
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Capacity allocation under noncooperative routing
• How bad is selfish routing?
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
• Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
• Avoiding the Braess paradox in non-cooperative networks
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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