Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values

DOI10.1007/s00224-015-9625-5zbMath1329.90051OpenAlexW2015654884MaRDI QIDQ904689

Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, George Christodoulou

Publication date: 13 January 2016

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-015-9625-5

zbMATH Keywords

schedulinganalysis of algorithmsapproximation algorithmsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems ⋮ Online scheduling of jobs with favorite machines ⋮ New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines

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